





























Abstract - This papers investigates the efficiency of aggregate choice in the long run when the individual 
decision is driven by both personal experience and imitation. Personal experience is represented by choice sets 
depending upon previous choices. Imitation is modeled first through popularity weighting and then through a 
network of social influences. 
Intuition suggests imitation can work as a source of variety, spreading behaviors among which memory can 
make selection. However inefficiencies will persist in the stochastically stable distribution whenever the length 
of memory is not sufficiently long to stop inferior behaviors from moving perpetually along periodic cycles of 
social influences. 
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 1 Introduction
Nothing is easier than choosing what is best. The matter in choice is
determining what is best. The amount of decisions an agent may be required
to take is usually incredibly large, and even larger is the set of external
factors which can aﬀect the consequences of any decision. This makes the
acquisition and elaboration of the whole of information required to assess the
value of every alternative, and hence to select the best one, a very diﬃcult
task, reasonably too diﬃcult for human cognitive capabilities. In a model of
bounded rationality - or, better, of limited cognitive capabilities1 - a speciﬁc
rule, or a class of rules, is assumed for agents in the process of simpliﬁcation
of decision problems. In this paper a process of cognitive simpliﬁcation based
on personal experience and imitation is built up and investigated.
The starting point is Boncinelli (2007b), which is the direct reference for
this paper, even for further clariﬁcation and reading about the representa-
tive structure.2 In that piece of work the limited information agents have
at their disposal comes solely from personal experience. Agents are able to
assess the value only of those alternatives they have directly experienced -
that is chosen at the previous time - and of those other alternatives which
are similar to experienced ones, in that they share with the former much of
the information for their evaluation. The alternatives which people are un-
acquainted with are supposed to be discarded from decision problems. The
resultant decision rule provides that choice falls upon the maximum in the
subset of selectable - or accessible, as often denoted - alternatives. Since any
choice which is diﬀerent from the previous one potentially modiﬁes the set of
accessible alternatives by modifying one’s own experience, a new maximum
is in principle available at any time; the outcome is a path of choices, ending
where the new maximum coincides with the old one. Such an alternative
is referred to as a local maximum. The described dynamics is then stud-
ied with the addition of perturbations, so obtaining a unique prediction of
ineﬃciency. The subsequent enlargement of personal experience by letting
people remember sequences of past choices shows to be a tool of selection
that, together with the variety of behaviors ensured by perturbations, allows
the best alternative to be selected and hence the system to reach eﬃciency.
Personal experience is clearly a very important channel for the acqui-
sition of information, being however not unique. Observation of others is
for instance another main source of information. The literature on informa-
tion cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992, 1998) has analyzed the eﬀects of
learning from others in a fully rational framework, producing an explana-
1See Boncinelli (2007a) for a discussion about rationality (consistency between aim
and means from a decision-maker’s point of view) and agents’ cognitive capabilities (the
speciﬁcation of this point of view).
2More general considerations about the background in which this paper takes root can
be found in Boncinelli (2007a).
1tion for many puzzling phenomena such as herding. Laboratory experiments
(Anderson and Holt, 1996, 1997) have then tested those theoretical predic-
tions with good results, so indirectly providing experimental evidence that
people indeed rely on others for their decision processes. A fully rational
approach may work rather well for an artiﬁcially simpliﬁed decision prob-
lem, but the requirements of cognitive capabilities become too demanding
in a more realistic environment. Therefore the way I suppose people rely
on others diﬀers substantially from that of the literature on information
cascades.
Some observations are worth considering. First, the introduction of imi-
tation makes population irremovable from any model. If choice is based only
on personal experience, then there is no need of others for an individual de-
cision problem. In Boncinelli (2007b) a population is used instead of a single
agent just for interpretative reasons. But when imitation is considered the
existence of someone else to imitate obviously becomes a necessity. This
intrinsically population-based nature of imitation causes some problems for
the linearity of the system, thus requiring an adjustment of the state space.
Second, there does not exist a natural way to combine personal expe-
rience and imitation unless interpersonal comparisons are admitted. Con-
sider a decision problem as the one is taking shape: once an agent knows
that an alternative is better than other ones by personal experience and
supposes that another alternative is not so bad since chosen by someone
else, then how can she decide among the two? In economic models where
imitation is adopted, agents usually imitate i) those who performed the
best (Vega-Redondo, 1997), ii) those who performed better than them with
a probability increasing in the payoﬀ diﬀerential (Schlag, 1998, 1999), iii)
whoever with a probabilty increasing in the observed payoﬀ (Schlag, 1999).
In any case this presupposes that people can observe others’ evaluations of
experienced alternatives and compare them. Such an hypothesis may suit
circumstances where choices yield monetary payoﬀs, but it is in general not
applicable.3 In this paper agents are simply assumed to rely at times upon
personal experience, by maximizing over what they know, and at other times
upon others by copying out their choices.4 Which are the times when imi-
tation prevails over personal experience is ﬁrst established probabilistically
and then on the basis of a network of social inﬂuences when memory is
3An empirical analysis has been carried out in Oﬀerman and Sonnemans (1998) where
evidence has been found in favor of the hypothesis that people learn both from their own
experience and from imitation of others. Moreover, they ﬁnd that successful individuals
are more likely to be imitated. Notice however that in their experiment interpersonal
comparisons were possible, while in many real environments they can be precluded or
hampered so making hard to establish what has been successful. In such cases it is likely
that observed behaviors will be taken into account in a diﬀerent way.
4In the way of modeling imitation this paper is closer to Ellison and Fudenberg (1993),
who consider agents’ decision rules incorporating popularity weighting, so that more pop-
ular choices are more likely to be adopted.
2introduced. From a conceptual point of view, there exist some similarities
between the transmission of behaviors in the present paper and the diﬀusion
of infections in epidemiology. See Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2003) for
a survey on epidemiology and networks.
Third, similarly to the remark about the role of population, the hypoth-
esis of identical preferences among agents, even if assumed in Boncinelli
(2007b) too, plays here a crucial role unlike when no imitation is consid-
ered. A choice by an agent reveals that an alternative is relatively the best,
for herself. From that choice an observer gets information about her own
preferences only when she knows the connection existing between their pref-
erence relations. Here it is assumed that all agents have the same preferences
deﬁned over the same set of possible alternatives.
In this paper a ﬁrst version of the model where personal experience is rep-
resented by a single choice, the last one, is followed by a second version where
agents remember a sequence of their own past choices. In any of the two
cases the analysis is carried out without and with perturbations. The study
of the perturbed system, following Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993),
Kandori et al. (1993) and Ellison (1993, 2000), allows to select among equi-
libria when the ultra-long run is considered. The comparison of results in
diﬀerent setups clariﬁes the contributions of memory, imitation and pertur-
bations and their reciprocal inﬂuences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 has been introducing the
subject matter and discussing the main hypotheses. Section 2 presents a
no-memory version of the model, where agents choose repeatedly over time
on the basis both of others’ choices and of their own at the previous time.
Section 3 enriches the model by allowing agents to store in memory a se-
quence of their own actions. Section 4 summarizes this contribution and
makes some conclusive remarks. Formal proofs of any result throughout the
paper are in appendix A.
2 Personal experience and imitation without mem-
ory
I begin this section by summarizing the basic model in Boncinelli (2007b)
and presenting some modiﬁcations in order to accomodate imitation as co-
determining factor for individual choice. Then both the unperturbed dynam-
ics and the perturbed one are analyzed. Finally, a variation of the model
is brieﬂy considered and a critical note ends this section. A more detailed
discussion about the underlying hypotheses and their interpretation is in the
introduction.
The model. Let C be the set of available choices and n its cardinality. Let
x be a vector representing how an inﬁnite population is shared out among
3choices. Let agents’ preferences be identical and representable by means of a
linear order5  deﬁned on C. Let A be the matrix of accessibility, that is an
adjacency matrix such that Aab = 1 if alternative b is accessible from a and
Aab = 0 otherwise. The notion of accessibility is aimed at representing the
role of personal experience; any choice gives an agent some information and
allows to evaluate those alternatives which are similar to the experienced
one in the sense of sharing most of the information required to be evaluated.
Following this reasoning the accessibility relation is assumed to be reﬂexive,
Aaa = 1 for any a ∈ C, and symmetric as well, Aab = 1 ⇒ Aba = 1
for all a,b ∈ C. On the basis of personal experience, an agent selects the
best alternative according to  among those she is able to evaluate. Hence
a matrix B, called of best accessibility, can be built in such a way that
Bab = 1 if b is the most preferred alternative among those accessible from a
and Bab = 0 otherwise. A choice a is called local maximum if Baa = 1 and
global maximum if it is the maximum according to . From here on I refer
to the eﬃcient state as that conﬁguration where the entire population is
bound to choose the global maximum. In any following discussion eﬃciency
is used as bench mark for the evaluation of results.
Throughout the paper I will use the notion of state with two diﬀerent
meanings, explicitly distinguishing only when necessary to avoid misunder-
standings. At times I will refer to a population state, that is a proﬁle of
choices for all agents, at other times I will refer to a state in Markovian
terminology. In the model under consideration a vector x is a generic pop-
ulation state while C is the space containing all the states of the Markov
chain with (degenerate) transition probabilities B.
Starting from any population state x0 the evolution according to the
dynamic rule xt+1 = xtB has been easily and completely characterized in
lemma 1 of Boncinelli (2007b). All the states where population is shared out
only among local maxima are equilibria. The initial condition x0 determines
which particular equilibrium will occur.
In the above-described model agents rely only on personal experience
to acquire information about the value of alternatives and hence to select
the known best. I now suppose that with probability α each agent relies
on imitation as source of information and guidance for choice. Let L be
a matrix such that Lab represents the probability that an imitating agent,
having experienced alternative a at time t, will choose alternative b at time
t + 1. A very simple and useful hypothesis is popularity weighting, i.e. the
probability to select an alternative by imitation is proportional to the frac-
tion of population currently choosing that alternative, so being Lab = xb.
The new dynamic rule, taking into account both personal experience and
5A linear order is a binary relation which is antisymmetric, transitive and total. Anti-
symmetry implies that agents cannot be indiﬀerent between two distinct alternatives; this
simpliﬁcation allows a simpler analysis without modifying the gist of results, as it should
be intuitively understood after reading the paper.
4imitation, can be expressed as follows:
xt+1 = xt(1 − α)B + xtαL
Notice that L is not a matrix of ﬁxed numbers, its elements being variable
with the composition of population choices. This is completely natural in
a model where imitation is considered. While personal experience depends
only on individual choices, imitation is necessarily determined by what oth-
ers do. The model, as it stands, seems to be non-linear and this represents
a severe technical complication. Fortunately, the hypothesis that the prob-
ability of imitation is proportional to the current distribution of population
choices comes to assistance. Since a generic column b of L has all its elements









a = 1. The dynamic rule, which comes out to be linear, can
therefore be re-written as in the following (1), where Bα ≡ [(1 − α)B + αI]
with I identity matrix.
xt+1 = xtBα (1)
By the comparison of Bα with B the eﬀects of imitation are clariﬁed. It
may be useful to reﬂect upon them. If xa is the mass of population currently
choosing alternative a, then at the next time that mass can be thought as
split into a fraction (1 − α) moving to the best available alternative and a
fraction α remaining in alternative a. Actual movements of people among
alternatives are more complicated; however, if the concern is not on who does
what but on how many do what then the representation may be simpliﬁed so
to be linear. The starting model of choice based on both personal experience
and imitation comes out to be formally equivalent to a model of choice of the
known best, due to personal experience, with a component of inertia, whose
intensity is measured by the same parameter α that measures the degree of
imitation. Notice that the lines of Bα corresponding to local maxima are
identical to those in B.
Proposition 1, which is intuitively established by the former considera-
tions, characterizes the behavior of dynamic system (1). Let ˜ S(b) be the
set of alternatives containing b itself and all the alternatives from which b
is reachable by some number of iterations of matrix B. Let da(b) denote
such number of iterations, with a ∈ ˜ S(b). Finally, let da be the number of
iterations required to reach a local maximum starting from alternative a,
that is the highest number of iterations allowed from a along a path of best
accessibility before reaching its end.
Lemma 1 (Equilibria). Let x0 be the initial population state.
1. i) If α = 1, then x0 is an equilibrium.
ii) If α < 1, then the system will converge to an equilibrium state ˜ x





0 if a / ∈ B(a)
P
b∈˜ S(a) x0
b if a ∈ B(a)
(2)
2. i) If α = 1 then no time must be waited for reaching an equilibrium.
ii) If α = 0 the waiting time for reaching ˜ x is d(x0) = maxx0
a>0 da.
iii) If 0 < α < 1 the triangular distance between the population state
















αt−s(1 − α)s (3)
A main observation derives from the comparison between α = 0 and 0 <
α < 1.6 The introduction of imitation as co-determining factor for individual
choice (when 0 < α < 1) produces the only eﬀect to slow down the process
of convergence to equilibrium. More extensively, while in the case without
imitation an equilibrium is reached in a ﬁnite number of periods - equal
to the maximum distance to be covered by some initially existing fraction
of population - with the addition of imitation the system tends towards an
equilibrium without ever reaching it. Because of imitation inferior choices
survive forever, only vanishing in the limit. The greater the parameter α the
slower the process of convergence to equilibrium; when α = 1 the system
is so slow to be motionless and any state is an equilibrium. Notice that
from any initial state the equilibrium which the system moves towards is
the same with and without imitation. Since the path from any initial state
towards its equilibrium is Pareto improving,7 then the addition of imitation
has produced a negative eﬀect from a welfare point of view by slowing down
the system.
Perturbations. With the main purpose of selection among possibly inﬁ-
nite equilibria I consider a perturbed version of dynamic system (1). With
probability n agents make a mistake and in that case any alternative is
supposed to be selected with the same probability. With the remaining
probability (1 − n) agents follow the decision process expressed by Bα. A
matrix Bα, comes out to be deﬁned as follows:
6When α = 0 imitative behaviors disappear and the system is reduced to the one
already characterized in lemma 1 of Boncinelli (2007b).
7Actually the path looks Pareto improving because opposite ﬂows of people are com-
pensated. However notice that under this dynamics, unlike the case without imitation, at





      
      
 if b 6= B(a) ∧ b 6= a
α(1 − n) +  if b 6= B(a) ∧ b = a
(1 − α)(1 − n) +  if b = B(a) ∧ b 6= a
1 − n +  if b = B(a) ∧ b = a
Since xt+1 = xtBα, is an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain,8 then
it will converge to the unique solution ˆ x = ˆ xBα, independently of the ini-
tial condition. The behavior of the dynamic system under consideration is
very similar to the behavior in case of no imitation, as revealed by com-
paring proposition 1 here in the following and the analogous proposition 1
in Boncinelli (2007b). Notice that the former is a generalization of the lat-
ter, which is obtained by setting α equal to zero.9 Leaving aside the case
when α = 1 since of no particular interest,10 let me restrict my attention
to the cases when α < 1. As previously dealt, from an overall perspective
imitation is equivalent to inertia, hence for α > 0 a correction due to the
greater stickiness of the system is required in the invariant distribution. In
particular, the equilibrium probability of the alternatives which are the best
accessible choice from no alternative increases from  to /[1−α(1−n)]. A
reduction instead occurs for local maxima since (1−α)(1−n)/[1−α(1−n)]
is less than (1 − n). The variation of the equilibrium probability for the
alternatives which are crossed by a path of best accessibility is ambiguous in
general, being positive only when n is suﬃciently small; this last condition
should however be granted by an interpretative argument.
Point 2 of the theorem is got by a simple limit operation of the expres-
sions in point 1 and comes out to be the same with and without imitation
(unless α = 1). The so-called stochastically stable distribution gives pos-
itive probability only to local maxima. In more detail, the ultra-long run
frequencies of local maxima are equal to the relative size of their basins of
attractions.
At last, point 3 provides a bound to the triangular distance between
8A Markov chain is said irreducible when there is a positive probability of moving from
any state of the Markov chain to any other state in a ﬁnite number of periods, and it is
said aperiodic when for every state s unity is the greatest common divisor of the set of all
the integers r such that there is a positive probability of moving from s to s in exactly r
periods.
9The expression here got when α = 0 may look diﬀerent from the one in Boncinelli










with l(a) the cardinality of ˜ S(a).
10Uniform perturbations simply spread population uniformly over alternatives.
7the system after a certain time and the equilibrium distribution.11 A very
simple remark is exploited to get this result: at any time people coming
from diﬀerent alternatives select the same choice with at least probability .
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Distribution). Let ˆ x be the solution of ˆ x =
ˆ xBα,. Then:
1. for all a ∈ C,
i) if α < 1 then:
ˆ xa() =

   




















if a ∈ B(a)
(4)





2. for all a ∈ C,







0 if a / ∈ B(a)
l(a)
n if a ∈ B(a)
(6)











a − ˆ xa| ≤ (1 − n)t X
a∈C
|x0
a − ˆ xa| (8)
11This is exactly the same bound, computed in the same way, as in the corresponding
point of proposition 1 in Boncinelli (2007b).
8A variation of the model. It may be useful to consider a modiﬁcation of
the previous model which produces simple but rather interesting results. I
now suppose that with probability α each agent relies on others not by simply
imitating them, but rather by having a conversation and then choosing what
is best according to them. Matrix L now represents this learning process.
Similarly to what previously done, the probability to meet and conversate
with someone whose best alternative is b is assumed to be equal to the
fraction of population who has chosen an alternative from which b is the
known best; that is, Lab = xBb.
The system appears to be non-linear but, again, luck comes to assistance.
Indeed, the b-th element of the vector xtL is xtBb
P
a xt




a = 1. Hence the system evolves over time according to
the following expression:
xt+1 = xtB (9)
The dynamic rule in (9) is the same as for the model of choice based
on personal experience only. The introduction of conversation allows agents
sometimes to rely on others’ experience rather than on their own. However,
if this happens in a proportional way, then it is as if agents exchanged their
experiences, and nothing actually changes if what interests is an aggregate
representation of population choices. Therefore, lemma 1 when α = 0 pro-
vides results about the behavior of the dynamic system in (9) as well. When
perturbations are inserted the reference is instead proposition 1.
A critical note. Before entering the issue of memory, I feel the need to
consider a possible critique to the above models. According to the story I
have told in the introduction, agents require information in order to eval-
uate alternatives, and they receive information by personal experience and
by imitation. Often the information got by personal experience and the in-
formation got by others concern sets of alternatives which are disjoint; in
those cases it is plausible to suppose that with some probability an agent
will rely upon either of the two sources of information. But when these
sets have a non-empty intersection, then a more sophisticated mechanism is
required for choice. In fact, an agent would reasonably never imitate some-
one choosing an alternative which she knows to be inferior by her personal
experience. However, an attempt to build up a more realistic process of
imitation in this setup would necessarily make the system non-linear. In the
next section some substantial modiﬁcations to the model will be introduced
in order to deal with memory and they will have the further eﬀect to allow
less restrictive imitation processes.
93 Personal experience and imitation with memory
Concepts are ﬁrst presented and then formalized in a model. Communication
classes are deﬁned with reference to the network of social inﬂuences and
some known results about them are recalled and subsequently exploited in
order to characterize the behavior both of the unperturbed system and of
the perturbed one. Some graphical representations are used as expositive
device.
Introductive considerations. The eﬀects of the introduction of mem-
ory have been analyzed in Boncinelli (2007b) by modifying the state space
from choices to sequences of choices of length equal to the length of agents’
memory. Now I want to set up a model which, preserving a linear form,12
allows to deal with memory and imitation. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion and underlined in the previous section, non-linearity is naturally linked
with imitation. However, when no memory is considered a linear form can
be preserved by virtue of compensation phenomena between ﬂows of people
coming from diﬀerent alternatives when appropriate imitation processes are
used. No such opportunity is available in the presence of memory, since
people keep trace of past choices and hence opposite ﬂows cannot balance
each other.
A particular device is usually exploited13 to preserve linearity, and hence
to keep on using Markov chains as representations. The same kind of trick
allows me to avoid this diﬃculty: a state of the Markov chain is no longer
deﬁned as an individual description but as a collective description. In other
words, the personal experiences of all agents are now required to identify
a single state of the system. This representation device, together with the
requirement of a ﬁnite state space for technical reasons, entails population
to be ﬁnite (an hypothesis which certainly cannot be accused of unrealism).
Such a state representation allows less restrictive assumptions, keeping the
dynamics linear.
What remains to be established is the working of the imitation mecha-
nism. Some kind of rule is needed to decide when people rely upon imitation
rather than personal experience to solve their decision problems. As ﬁrst
possibility, consider a probabilistic rule similar to the one used in the previ-
ous section.
Suppose that every agent has a certain probability to imitate and the
complementary probability to choose her known best. Suppose also that
the behaviors agents copy out are established probabilistically too, with
probabilities based on the existing fractions of behaviors or determined in
12Linearity is here to be taken nearly as a synonym of tractability of the model, and
therefore it is much sought after.
13See for instance Young (1993, 1998).
10some other way, and with personal experience in case preventing people from
imitating the choices known to be inferior.
A brief reﬂection reveals that, unless particular degenerate probabilities,
such a mechanism always gives positive probability to the survival of only
one behavior within a ﬁnite time, since almost any conceivable sequence
of behaviors based on imitation and personal experience is allowed for each
agent. It is straightforward to establish that only the states where the entire
population chooses the same local maximum are equilibria under this dy-
namics. Furthermore, notice that from any state a single perturbation can
bring the global maximum into existence; after that, it can spread through-
out population by imitation. On the contrary a single perturbation is never
suﬃcient for the system to leave the eﬃcient state because of memory, when
personal experience prevents from the imitation of known inferior behaviors.
This heuristic reasoning helps to understand that with such an imitation
mechanism the stochastically stable distribution gives probability 1 to the
eﬃcient state.
However, I argue that a probabilistic imitation process is a questionable
choice in this framework from a modeling point of view. In particular, I won-
der whether homogeneous states are the only relevant ones when population
is very large. Peculiar sequences of occurrences, or an extremely long time,
are required for the system to end up in one of those states. If one agrees
that a small but signiﬁcant amount of noise should be actually present in
the model, then the probabilities of those sequences of occurrences and of
perturbations might be of the same magnitude, or the necessary amount of
time suﬃciently large for many perturbations to happen. In this case, the
stochastically stable distribution would be a very poor prediction, since any
probability is bound to be much greater than the probability of a pertur-
bation when the limit for the latter going to zero is computed. Therefore,
the choice to use the stochastically stable distribution - since easier to be
computed - requires a particular care in establishing transition probabilities
in order to obtain a meaningful prediction.
The above argument, together with an intuitive view of how people copy
out behaviors from others, takes me to ground the imitation mechanism on a
network of social inﬂuences. If an agent exerts an inﬂuence over another one,
then I refer to the former as a model for the latter. An agent always imitates
her models unless by personal experience she knows she makes a mistake by
doing that, with this last condition in reply to the critical note at the end of
the previous section. The choice whether to select the known best or to copy
out an observed behavior is hence deterministic. The degree of imitation can
be roughly measured by how many models agents have. As extreme cases,
in a complete network a behavior can spread to the overall population in
just one period, while in an empty network no imitation occurs. It should
be remarked, however, that the network environment allows a large variety
of imitation structures which cannot be summarized by a single parameter
11such as the degree of imitation. It is just by exploiting the richness inherent
in netwoks that the main results of this paper are obtained.
The model. Let M be a ﬁnite set of players with cardinality m. Let G be a
m×m adjacency matrix such that if Gij = 1 then a behavior potentially ﬂows
from i to j, that is j is a potential imitator of i. No particular property is
imposed on G but irreﬂexivity, Gii = 0 for any agent i. Matrix G represents
the existing structure of social inﬂuences. Let (C,A,) be deﬁned as in the
previous section. A model is now a quintuple (C,A,,M,G).
A state s of the system is deﬁned as a complete description of the se-
quences of choices - the current one and all the remembered past ones - for
the entire population. Notice that now a population state coincide with a
state of the Markov chain. The cardinality of the state space is n(km). Let
z be a vector with n(km) components, each of them expressing the probabil-
ity to be in the corresponding state. The eﬃcient state is the state where
the global maximum a holds any position in the sequence of choices of any
agent.
Given a certain sequence of choices - or a memory, as sometimes called
- deﬁne the accessible set as the collection of those alternatives which are
accessible from at least one of the choices in the sequence. Formally, even if
with some abuse of notation, deﬁne A(b) as the set of alternatives accessible
from b. Then the accessible set from a memory (b1,b2,...,bk) is
Sk
r=1 A(br).
Consider the following individual rule of choice. An agent will select the
known best alternative, that is the maximum in the accessible set according
to , unless some of her models is selecting an alternative which she does
not know to be inferior. In the latter case the agent will imitate the model.14
In other words a choice is imitable for an agent if it is either equal to
her known best or uncomparable with it, since outside the accessible set.
If the choices of a few of agent i’s models are imitable at the same time,
then each of them is supposed to have a strictly positive probability to be
transmitted. I will sometimes refer to the failure for some behavior to be
passed on because of jams in the network of social inﬂuences as a congestion
problem.
Formally, let (b1,...,bk) be i’s memory at time t and let b be j’s choice
at time t. If Gji = 1 and either b = max
Sk
r=1 A(br) or b / ∈
Sk
r=1 A(br),
then i’s choice at time t+1 will surely be determined by imitation and with
positive probability it will be b.
The resulting transition matrix Pk is a n(km)×n(km) matrix such that for
any couple of states (s1,s2), Pk
s1s2 > 0 if and only if any sequence of choices
in s2 is obtainable by the sequence in s1 corresponding to the same agent
14In the model without memory the couple (A,) could be summarized by B. Here that
is no longer the case, since some pieces of information given by the accessibility matrix A
are not contained in B while they are used for establishing whether agents imitate.
12by deleting the oldest alternative, moving all the other alternatives one step
back in memory and adding as current choice an alternative to which the
individual rule of choice assigns positive probability. Obviously Pk
s1s2 is zero
in any other case. The superscript k simply recalls how such matrix depends
on the length of memory.
Unperturbed dynamics: analysis and results. I am interested in the
following dynamics:
zt+1 = ztPk (10)
The system in (10) is a Markov chain. Now I introduce some terminology
used in Markov chain theory with the purpose of simplifying the following
analysis.
Two states are deﬁned as communicating if there is a positive probability
to move from either state to the other one in a ﬁnite number of periods.
Communication is an equivalence relation and therefore the state space can
be partitioned into so-called communication classes. A communication class
which once entered is never left is called an ergodic set. If an ergodic set
contains only one element, such a state is called absorbing. A simple and
well known result is that a Markov chain converges almost surely towards
ergodic sets.
States where all agents’ memories are full of the same local maximum
are examples of absorbing states. The eﬃcient state is therefore absorbing
too. These kinds of states would be absorbing in the known best dynamics
too and actual imitation phenomena are here excluded by the presence of
only one behavior.15
The introduction of imitation brings about as distinctive eﬀect the pos-
sibility of ergodic sets which are not singletons, as it is shown in ﬁgure 1,
where three simple structures of social inﬂuences are represented as net-
works. Arrows are pointed from a model towards an inﬂuenced agent.
Consider case i). Suppose agent 1 has always been choosing a certain lo-
cal maximum in the last k periods and agent 2 has always been choosing an
inferior local maximum in the last k periods, with k the length of memory.
Agent 2 will never change her behavior either by imitation, since she is not
inﬂuenced by anyone, or by personal experience, since she has always been
choosing the same local maximum and will never experience a new alterna-
tive. Agent 2 is the unique model for agent 1. Hence agent 1 imitates agent
2 the next time and whenever her personal experience does not prevent her
from doing that. After experiencing the other alternative, agent 1 will come
back selecting her previous superior choice thanks to memory. In addition
15Indeed, according to the working of the imitation mechanism all the agents inﬂuenced
by models would imitate them, since the observed behavior is not inferior to any known.
In this case, however, relying upon imitation instead of personal experience makes no
diﬀerence.








Figure 1: Non-singleton ergodic sets.
memory allows her not to copy out her bad model until the unpleasant ex-
perience is consigned to oblivion. Summing up, agent 2 always chooses the
same alternative while agent 1 cyclically selects for k periods her superior
choice and then imitates her model once.
Consider case ii). Suppose the length of memory is two. Let memories
be (a,a), (a,b) and (b,a) for agents 1, 2 and 3 respectively, with a a local
maximum and b an inferior alternative, not necessarily a local maximum,
such that a  B(b). By convention, from here on more recent choices are
represented more on the left in memory. The next time choice b ﬂows from
agent 3 to agent 1 and sequences in memory are so modiﬁed: (b,a), (a,a) and
(a,b) for agents 1, 2 and 3 respectively. By an adequate relabeling of agents,
each of them playing the same role in the structure of social inﬂuences, the
initial state is found again, so determining the everlasting movement of the
inferior choice b along the cycle of social inﬂuences. Notice that even if b is
not a local maximum, it is not substituted by the best accessible alternative
B(b) since a  B(b). Notice also that if the length of memory was greater
than two, then no cycle would be possible.
Cycles are particular instances of non-singleton ergodic sets. Case iii)
illustrates another possibility. Suppose the sequence in memory for agent
1 contains only local maximum a while the sequence in memory for agent
3 contains only local maximum b, with a  b. Obviously they keep on
selecting the same local maximum forever, no social inﬂuence existing over
them. Finally suppose that agent 2’s memory has alternative a repeated for
k−1 times and alernative b in the more recent position. Since a  b, memory
prevents agent 2 from choosing b again for k periods. Hence alternative
b gradually moves into the past for agent 2 till it is forgotten and only
alternative a is in memory. The next period both choices have a chance to
be copied out by agent 2. If b prevails, the above-explained k steps follow
again. If a is transmitted, exactly the same state is found again with only a
in agent 2’s memory. After suﬃciently long time the system can be in any
14of the k + 1 described states and hence no cyclic movement is here present.
The concept of communication classes has been previously mentioned
when introducing Markov chains. Now it is more deeply treated in applica-
tion to the network of social inﬂuences. If Gij = 1 agent i has a direct social
inﬂuence over agent j, as already deﬁned.
Consider the notion of indirect social inﬂuence. If there exists a positive
integer r ≥ 2 such that Gr
ij = c > 0, then agent i has an indirect inﬂuence
over agent j through c sequences of intermediate agents of length r − 1.
Consider now the following relation: there exists a non-negative integer r
such that Gr
ij > 0. Here agent i can contact agent j directly or indirectly, or
i = j since G0
ii = 1. This relation is a preorder, since reﬂexive and transitive,
and it can be used to classify and partially order the set of agents. The
induced equivalence classes, called communication classes, are such that two
distinct agents belong to the same class when they can exert an inﬂuence
(directly or indirectly) over each other. Deﬁne a communication class as
maximal when it is not inﬂuenced by any other class. Obviously, a plurality
of maximal communication classes may exist.
Lemmata 2 and 3 have the main purpose to work as basic ﬁndings for
proving all the results in the rest of the paper. Lemma 2 provides some
standard results about communication classes.
Lemma 2 (Communication Classes). Let i and j belong to whatever com-
munication class C. Let Tij be the set of positive integers t such that
agent i has a direct or indirect social inﬂuence of length t over agent j,
Tij ≡ {t ≥ 1 : Gt
ij > 0}. Let pi be the greatest common divisor of Tii. Then,
i) pi = pj ≡ p,
ii) communication class C can be partitioned into p cyclic classes indexed
by 0,1,...,p − 1 such that if j ∈ cyclic class u and t ∈ Tjr then r ∈
cyclic class (u + t) mod p,
iii) there exists ˆ t such that if i belongs to cyclic class u then for all t ≥ ˆ t,
t ∈ Til for all l belonging to cyclic class (u + t) mod p.
In other words, after suﬃciently long time a behavior may be taken by
means of imitation from an agent to any other agent in the appropriate
cyclic class; obviously, congestion problems and memory could prevent this
from happening. I refer to p as the period of a communication class.
Lemma 3 provides straightforward results which, left aside the preventing
eﬀects of memory which should be excluded for each speciﬁc case, establish
the positive probability of chains of imitations simply by exploiting the hy-
pothesis that every imitable behavior always has a chance to spread from
model to imitator.
15Lemma 3 (Behavior Propagation). Suppose that agent 1 selects alternative
a at time t1, agent 2 selects alternative a at time t2, ..., agent l selects al-
ternative a at time tl. Let ˜ t = max{t1,t2,...,tl}. Suppose also that memory
never prevents alternative a from spreading.
i) Then for all t > ˜ t, there is a positive probability that every agent j
such that G
t−ti
ij > 0 for some agent i = 1,...,l selects alternative a at
time t.
ii) Suppose also that t1 = t2 = ... = tl = ˜ t and 1,2,...,l are all the
agents in cyclic class u of communication class C. Suppose that either
C is maximal or all the agents of any communication class directly
or indirectly inﬂuencing C choose alternative a forever. Then for all
t > ˜ t every agent j belonging to cyclic class (u + t − ˜ t) mod p of C
selects alternative a at time t.
It is worth stressing that what happens in maximal communication
classes aﬀects the whole system. On the contrary, since a maximal com-
munication class is not inﬂuenced by anything outside, then the Markov
chain in (10) can be restricted to such a communication class keeping on to
be a Markov chain. When I write about absorbing states or ergodic sets for
maximal communication classes I refer to these restricted Markov chains.
The following lemma states precisely an intuitive kind of inﬂuence which
maximal communication classes have on the behavior of the system.
Lemma 4 (Maximal Communication Classes). Suppose that in every maxi-
mal communication class of G the global maximum is selected by all agents.
Then the system will converge almost surely to the eﬃcient state.
Lemma 4 tells that, if the concern is on the achievement of the eﬃcient
state, then attention can be restricted to maximal communication classes.
Lemma 5 helps in establishing what happens in the latter. A cycle of social
inﬂuences is deﬁned as a sequence of distinct agents 1,2,...,s such that
Gii+1 = 1, 1 ≤ i < s, and Gs1 = 1.
Lemma 5 (Eﬃciency). Let C be a maximal communication class of G, p
its period, k the length of memory, a the global maximum.
i) if k > n − ||A(a)||, and there exists an agent in C with alternative a
as current or remembered choice and there does not exist in C a cycle
of length greater than k, then eﬃciency in C is reached almost surely;
ii) if there exists a cyclic class of C with all the agents therein simulta-
neously choosing alternative a and there does not exist in C a cycle of
length greater than k, then eﬃciency in C is reached in a ﬁnite time.
16A possible cause of ineﬃciency is the lack of accessibility of the global
maximum; that happens if any one is not currently choosing it and neither
an alternative in its basin of attraction. In such a case the global maxi-
mum cannot be discovered. Furthermore, even when the global maximum
is chosen by someone, its survival is not guaranteed. Imitation can help it
to spread to people unable to ﬁnd it out by their own experience. However,
imitation is also a possible source of extinction for the global maximum,
helping the spreading of other alternatives too. Memory seems to favour
the survival of the global maximum: when an unknown inferior alternative
is copied out, memory allows the recall of the previous superior alternative
and hence its recovery. But if unknown inferior alternatives are copied out
uninterruptedly for a suﬃciently long time, then the global maximum is
consigned to oblivion. How many periods a suﬃciently long time consists
of is obviously determined by the length of memory in conjunction with the
structure of accessibility.
Two simple observations are in order here. On one side imitation of
unknown alternatives can induce people to give up the global maximum.
On the other side congestion problems in transmission by imitation can
hinder its diﬀusion.
The former observation is at the basis of the ﬁrst suﬃcient condition in
lemma 5 for the prevailing of eﬃciency in a maximal communication class.
Once the global maximum is experienced, then it cannot be forgotten if suf-
ﬁciently many alternatives do not exist. Whenever chosen the global max-
imum can spread to others with positive probability, since never prevented
by memory, and then it will sooner or later be experienced, and hence never
forgotten, by all agents.
The second suﬃcient condition in lemma 5 is based on the second obser-
vation. When all the agents of a certain cyclic class u choose at the same
time t the global maximum, then no room is left for its extinction by virtue
of point ii in lemma 3. To illustrate the gist of the reasoning, no congestion
problems are possible since all the agents of cyclic class u+1 are inﬂuenced
only by agents in cyclic class u, and memory cannot prevent the spreading
of the best alternative. Then the entire cyclic class u + 1 will select the
global maximum at time t + 1. The same reasoning can be applied forever,
so establishing that the best alternative can never disappear.
Once the survival of the global maximum is somehow guaranteed, still the
possibility of ineﬃcient conﬁgurations remains for a maximal communication
class. Consider case ii) in ﬁgure 1 and suppose a is the global maximum.
There exist three cyclic classes, each consisting of a single agent. Two of
the agents have their memories full of the global maximum, so ensuring its
everlasting survival. However the inferior alternative b survives forever too,
hence keeping the system away from eﬃciency. One may think to rule out
this possibility simply requiring k ≥ p. However the following example in
ﬁgure 2 shows this is not the case, suggesting a more complicated relation
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Figure 2: Room for ineﬃciencies.
The period of the communication class in ﬁgure 2 is clearly 2. Suppose
a, b1, a, b2, a, b3, b1 are the current choices for agents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
respectively, with a the global maximum. Suppose also that no alternative is
accessible from any other alternative. Finally let the length of memory be 3
and let the sequences in memory be (a,b1,a), (b1,a,b2), (a,b2,a), (b2,a,b3),
(a,b3,a), (b3,a,b1) and (b1,a,b2) for agents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
The next time the system will be characterized by the sequences (b3,a,b1),
(a,b1,a), (b1,a,b2), (a,b2,a), (b2,a,b3), (a,b3,a) and (a,b1,a), in the same
order as before. Another application of the dynamic rule transforms the
sequences in (a,b2,a), (b2,a,b3), (a,b3,a), (b3,a,b1), (a,b1,a), (b1,a,b2) and
(b2,a,b3) respectively. By a simple relabeling of alternatives b1, b2 and b3,
which play the same role in this dynamic mechanism, the initial state is
found again, so showing the existence of an endless cycle.
In both suﬃcient conditions of lemma 5 the survival of inferior alter-
natives is prevented by a rather strong assumption, based on the following
observation: the existence of a cycle of social inﬂuences of length greater
than the length of memory is a necessary condition for an inferior behavior
to ﬂee forever once some superior alternative is known. In fact, being the
number of agents ﬁnite, a behavior necessarily has to come back to people
having already experienced it. If no suﬃciently long cycle exists, then agents
will be prevented from imitating such a behavior by their memory.17 A class
of networks which naturally lends itself to satisfy this condition of shortness
16I think this kind of relation could be studied in deeper details in the attempt to
characterize it precisely. However I guess the gain would not be worth the eﬀort, at least
if seen from a strictly economic point of view.
17In the attempt to establish an analogy, it may be useful to mention the two main
categories of models in epidemiology: i) the SIR models, where an agent passes from
being susceptible (S), to turning infected (I), to ﬁnally being recovered (R) and immune
from other infections; ii) the SIS models, where an agents passes from being susceptible
18of cycles is represented by ﬂowers, where a central agent works as corolla,
while the other agents form petals. An example is given in ﬁgure 3. Notice
that petals can have diﬀerent dimensions, that is diﬀerent lengths of their















8 66 hh 9
gg
Figure 3: A ﬂower.
By combining lemma 4 and lemma 5 some conclusions are drawn. With-
out imitation the network of social inﬂuences is empty and there are n
maximal communication classes, each formed by a single isolated agent. In
order to reach eﬃciency in such a case, for every agent the best accessible
alternative from the initial sequence in memory must belong to the basin of
attraction of the global maximum. In the presence of a structure of social
inﬂuences lemma 4 allows to restrict attention for what concerns eﬃciency
to a limited number of agents, those belonging to maximal communica-
tion classes. What happens in each maximal communication class can be
extremely complicated. Each local maximum can prevail or cycles with non-
singleton ergodic sets can emerge, that depending upon the initial condition
and upon the network of social relationships. Lemma 5 provides a couple
of intuitive suﬃcient conditions for reaching eﬃciency. This large variety
of possible results is anyway unsatisfactory and calls for some selection of
predictions, which will be provided in the next paragraph.
Perturbed dynamics: analysis and results. Results in the previous
section help in determining what can happen, but they do not provide a
unique prediction. The introduction of perturbations, sometimes called mu-
(S), to turning infected (I), to becoming again susceptible (S). In my model the diﬀusion
mechanism of inferior choices through imitation falls in between the above-mentioned
categories, so to deserve the SIRS label: an agent passes from being susceptible (S) to
copy out an inferior choice when that choice is not prevented by memory, to turning
infected (I) through its actual adoption, to being recovered (R) and temporarily immune
from the same mistake, to ﬁnally becoming again susceptible (S) when the inferior choice
is forgotten.
19tations to remember the biological origins of this kind of models, allows to
solve this drawback.
As a consequence of the addition of perturbations, each agent with prob-
ability (1−n) behaves as in the unperturbed case, while with the remaining
n probability she chooses a randomly selected alternative. The resultant
transition matrix is denoted by Pk,. The system into analysis is therefore
characterized by the following rule of evolution:
zt+1 = ztPk, (11)
Such a system is an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain and hence
it converges to the unique ˆ z such that ˆ z = ˆ zPk,, called invariant distri-
bution. The stochastically stable distribution is the limit of the invariant
distribution as the probability of perturbations goes to zero. Some useful
techniques18 are availbale for determining which states belong to the sup-
port of this limiting distribution. Basically, only the states easiest to reach
receive a positive probability in the stochastically stable distribution, with
easiest interpreted as requiring the fewest perturbations, since as  → 0 per-
turbations become much rarer than any other event. Propositions 6 and 7
establish how easy in terms of perturbations is to reach the eﬃcient state
and to leave it respectively. Combining these ﬁndings with known results
proposition 2 is found.
Lemma 6 (Towards Eﬃciency). Consider the dynamics in (11) restricted to
a maximal communication class C of G. Let p be the period of C. From any
state s there exists a sequence of ergodic sets of the unperturbed dynamics
E1,E2,...,Ep, with Ep the eﬃcient state, such that a single perturbation
allows to go with positive probability from s to E1 and if p > 1 from Ei to
Ei+1 for any 1 ≤ i < p.
An intuitive explanation of lemma 6 is here provided. Let a be the global
maximum. A single perturbation can induce an agent to choose a and then
the imitation mechanism can spread that alternative so to be chosen by all
the agents of a cyclic class at a same future time. If that happens an ergodic
set of the unperturbed dynamics has been reached since all the agents of
every cyclic class will keep on choosing the global maximum at least with
period p. Analogously, another single perturbation can induce a cycle with
a diﬀerent timing. A sequence of no more than p steps is so built, the last
ergodic set being the eﬃcient state, having p diﬀerent cycles of alternative
a in motion.
Lemma 7 (Away from Eﬃciency). Consider the dynamics in (11) restricted
to a maximal communication class C of G. Let p be the period of C, k the
length of memory, a the global maximum.
18Standard references are Young (1993), Kandori et al. (1993) and Ellison (2000).
20i) Suppose k = 1 and p = 1. Then a single perturbation can move the
system from the eﬃcient state to another ergodic set if and only if
there exists a local maximum diﬀerent from a.
ii) Suppose k > 1 or p > 1 or both. Then a single perturbation can move
the system from the eﬃcient state to another ergodic set if and only if
A(a) 6= C and k < p.
I now discuss lemma 7. Suppose to be in the eﬃcient state. When p = 1
a single behavior, in case introduced by a single perturbation, eventually
spreads to all agents at the same time, with k = 1 only requiring the pre-
vailing behavior to be a local maximum. Consider the case when k > 1
and p > 1. A single perturbation can induce an agent to choose another
alternative, which obviously must be outside a’s accessible set to have some
chance to survive. No other alternative can rise in the known best dynamics.
In fact, when k > 1 the global maximum is never forgotten. When instead
p > 1 the existence of more cyclic classes implies that either each potential
imitator chooses a or all her models choose a; therefore a is the known best
in the former case and the unique imitable choice in the latter case. As a
consequence, the only possibility except coming back to the eﬃcient state is
an endless survival of the inferior alternative arisen from the perturbation.
However, when k ≥ p the inferior alternative ends up coming back when
it is still in memory, so determining its rejection by memory and hence its
extinction. When k < p with positive probability all the agents of a cyclic
class end up choosing the inferior behavior at the same time, so generating
an everlasting cycle by point ii of lemma 3.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Distribution with Memory). Consider the dy-
namics in (11). Let pC be the period of the generic maximal communication
class C and k the length of memory. Let E be the union of ergodic sets
which have positive probability in the stochastically stable distribution. Let
W(s,E,) be the expected wait until a state belonging to the set E is ﬁrst
reached when the system starts in state s. Then:
1. E contains only the eﬃcient state if and only if in all the maximal
communication classes of G one of the following conditions is satisﬁed:
i) k = 1 and p = 1 and there does not exist a local maximum diﬀer-
ent from the global one.
ii) A(a) = C or k ≥ p.
2. For any state s / ∈ E, W(s,E,) = O(1/) as  → 0.
By the application of lemmata 6 and 7 to standard mutations counting
techniques a unique prediction for the system in (11) is obtained in point 1
of proposition 2. Suppose that agents have actual memory (k > 1) and that
21the global maximum does not allow a full accessibility (A(a) 6= C). Then
the period of every maximal communication class being not greater than
the length of memory is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the sys-
tem to spend approximately all its time in the eﬃcient state for a vanishing
amount of noise. Therefore, how imitation inﬂuences population welfare is
not a matter of intensity; as extreme cases, both the complete network and
the empty one satisfy the condition for eﬃciency. Imitation works against
eﬃciency only when a particular cyclic structure exists in at least one maxi-
mal communication class of the social network. When this kind of ciclicity is
present, a single perturbation can move the system both towards and away
from the eﬃcient state. Notice that an increase in the length of memory
may push the system towards eﬃciency, since making the inequality k ≥ p
easier to be satisﬁed.
Point 2 of proposition 2 tries to establish a bound on the time of con-
vergence. This kind of bounds are always useful when working with the
stochastically stable distribution since a very long time may be required for
its prediction to become relevant. By following Ellison (1993), let W(s,E,)
denote the expected wait until a state belonging to the set E is ﬁrst reached
when the system starts in state s; its behavior as  tends to zero is stud-
ied. By applying lemma 6 to theorem 2 in Ellison (1993), it is found that
W(s,E,) = O(1/) as  → 0, which is a shorthand for there exist C, ¯  > 0
such that W(s,E,) < C(1/) for all  ∈ (0,¯ ).
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Figure 4: Eﬃcient or not?.
In ﬁgure 4 there exist four communication classes: {1,2,3}, {4,5,6,7},
{8,9,10,11,12,13}, {14,15}. Only the ﬁrst two of them are maximal. As-
22sume whatever set C of available choices and whatever preference relation
on it, with the only condition that A(a) 6= C with a the global maximum.
Suppose k = 2. Will the system reach eﬃciency in the very long run? No,
since the period of both the maximal communication classes is larger than
2. Suppose now k = 3. Again ineﬃciencies will survive in the stochastically
stable distribution because the period in the second maximal communica-
tion class is still larger than the length of memory. Eﬃciency will be granted
if k ≥ 4. But how can eﬃciency be got with k = 3? Two ways are available:
i) reducing the period of the second maximal communication class by the
addition of another link among them; ii) making that set of players no more
a maximal communication class, by the removal of a link among them of by
the addition of a link from an outer agent towards one of them. I conclude
with a ﬁnal remark. Consider ﬁgure 4 with k = 4. We know that the system
will reach eﬃciency, however this result can be considered not very robust
in the following sense: the removal of a single link - the one from 7 to 13 - is
suﬃcient to allow ineﬃciencies. Notice that for k ≥ 6 this weakness would
be taken away.
4 Conclusions
Where do personal experience and imitation drive choice? This question is
investigated by two main models. A common setup provides a population
of agents choosing repeatedly over time within a ﬁnite set of alternatives.
Personal experience allows the ordering in terms of preference of only some
of the alternatives for lack of information required for evaluation. Agents
at times choose their known best, at other times they copy out a behavior
they observe.
In the ﬁrst model agents’ personal experience is assumed to be formed
by their last choice, population is inﬁnite and the criterion used to establish
when relying upon personal experience and when upon observed behaviors
is probabilistic. Moreover, if behaviors are copied out proportionally to their
diﬀusion, then a linear form for the model is preserved in spite of the non-
linear nature of imitation. In short, in such a context imitation is formally
equivalent to inertia and has the unique eﬀect to slow down the system with
negative consequences for population welfare.
A slight variation is also considered, where imitating people do not copy
out an observed behavior but select the best alternative accessible from that
observed behavior (as if they had conversated). In this case imitation has
no eﬀect.
In both versions the analysis when perturbations are added provides a
prediction of ineﬃciency.
In the second model agents are endowed with memory, which allows them
to remember a sequence of past choices. Having a larger personal experi-
23ence they are allowed to rank in preference more alternatives. However this
enlarged personal experience brings about major problems of non-linearity
that impose a change in the state space of the Markov chain, which in turn
requires a ﬁnite population. Moreover, a remark about the risks of using the
stochastically stable distribution as an approximated prediction for a system
with a small but ﬁnite amount of noise suggests imitation to be modeled in
a non-probabilistic way when population is ﬁnite. In particular, a directed
network of social inﬂuences is used to describe channels through which be-
haviors can ﬂow by imitation. An agent imitates some of the people she is
inﬂuenced by whenever memory does not prevent her from doing that.
In the unperturbed dynamics many diﬀerent outcomes are possible, among
which cycles and other non-singleton predictions. The main results concern
the fundamental role played by maximal communication classes of the net-
work of social inﬂuences, and the identiﬁcation of suﬃcient conditions for
reaching eﬃciency.
When perturbations are added the stochastically stable distribution is
used to get a unique prediction. The existence of a maximal communication
class with a period longer than the length of memory represents the main
source of ineﬃciency for the system.
Some conclusive speculative discussion follows. Imitation aﬀects the dy-
namics of the system in a non trivial way. The evolution driven by only
personal experience has the limit to be trapped in local maxima. The addi-
tion of perturbations brings variety, while the possibility for agents to store
their personal experience in memory makes room for comparison and hence
selection.19 In an unperturbed dynamics, the inclusion of imitation as guid-
ance for choice can play to some extent the same role of perturbations as
source of variety. The limits of imitation compared to perturbations concern
the incapacity to create inexistent behaviors, being only capable to spread
existing ones, and its non-vanishing frequency of occurrence. The latter fea-
ture may keep on producing novelties from the point of view of single agents,
so allowing the survival of inferior behaviors in particular cases even when
perturbations are added.
More extensively, imitation has two constrasting eﬀects on an inferior
choice. From one side, imitation allows that choice to be copied out and
hence to survive the selection by one’s own memory. From the other side,
the larger the diﬀusion of the choice the lower the number of next possible
imitators, since personal experience makes agents immune from making the
same mistake again for a number of periods equal to the length of memory.
An increase in the length of memory has the consequence to strengthen the
latter eﬀect so making conditions for eﬃciency more easily satisﬁed.
My ﬁnal observation is aimed at stressing the importance of the interac-
tion structure, especially from the point of view of a public authority aiming
19This result is the main ﬁnding in Boncinelli (2007b).
24at promoting eﬃciency: a policy of public intervention may take advantage
of the existence of a network of social inﬂuences by concentrating its eﬀorts
on maximal communication classes or, if possible, properly modifying the
structure of inﬂuences.
A Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. Point 1.i is immediately established since Bα = I
when α = 1.
By lemma 1 of Boncinelli (2007b) it is known that an equilibrium of
dynamics B is reached within a ﬁnite time, d(x0). Therefore Bt ≡ ˆ B for


















































As t → ∞ in the last expression αtI clearly tends to the null matrix, the





each term of the summatory, and the coeﬃcient of ˆ B in the third addend
tends to 1 for the just explained reasons. Therefore, limt→∞(Bα)t = ˆ B. By
lemma 1 in Boncinelli (2007b) point 1.ii follows.
Point 2.i is trivial from previous point 1.i. Point 2.ii is point 2 of lemma
1 in Boncinelli (2007b). Consider point 2.iii. If α < 1, starting from alter-
native a after da repetitions of the known best dynamics a local maximum
is reached and never left. Therefore, after t periods the probability not to
have reached the ownwards local maximum is given by the probability that
less than da times matrix B has been applied. If t ≥ da and α > 0 this






αt−s(1 − α)s. Considering how population
is initially shared out among alternatives and how the triangular distance is
computed the desired result is got. 
25Proof of proposition 1. I ﬁrst prove point 1.i. Suppose α = 1. Any
alternative a can be reached from any alternative by perturbation and from




ˆ xb + (1 − n)ˆ xa =  + (1 − n)ˆ xa =
1
n
The proof of point 1.ii is by induction. Suppose α < 1. Notice that
if an alternative a is the best accessible choice from no alternative, then
ˆ xa = /[1−α(n−)], in accordance with (4). Any ˆ xa relative to an alternative
a which is not a local maximum can be expressed as follows:
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(12)
Any ˆ xa relative to a local maximum a can be expressed as follows:
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(13)
Suppose that (4) holds for all the alternatives from which a is the best
accessible choice. Then 12 can be rewritten as:
ˆ xa =

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Consider the following relations, which allow to transform (14) and (15) into
the desidered parts of (4).
26i) db(c) + 1 = db(a) if c 6= a, a = B(c) and b ∈ ˜ S(c)















(1 − α)(1 − n)
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= 1
Point 2 of the proposition is easily established by taking the limit of the
previously found expressions as  tends to zero.
Finally, as regards the bound to the rate of convergence in (8), it is got
as in Boncinelli (2007b), to which I refer for the proof.
Proof of lemma 2. Each Tij is non-empty since C is a communication
class. Moreover, being each Tii closed under addition, it contains inﬁnite
positive integers, of which the greatest common divisor is by hypothesis pi.
A ﬁnite subset of Tii with pi as greatest common divisor must exist. In
fact, take two numbers in Tii with ˜ p their greatest common divisor. If all
the other numbers in Tii can be divided by ˜ p, then a ﬁnite sequence has
already been found. If there exists a number which is not divisible by ˜ p,
that number is added to the ﬁrst two and their greatest common divisor is
computed. The same reasoning applies, but since ˜ p is ﬁnite it cannot be
reduced too many times without reaching its lowest conceivable value of 1,
so proving the initial assertion. Let n1, n2, ..., nr denote the elements of
this ﬁnite subset.
I prove point i). Take two agents in C, say i and j. Let m1 be in
Tji and m2 be in Tij. Obviously, (m1 + m2) belongs to Tjj. Furthermore,
(m1 +ns +m2) with s = 1,...,r belongs to Tjj too. Suppose pj > pi. Since
(m1 + m2) and any (m1 + ns + m2) are divisible by pj, it follows that each
ns is divisible by pj, against the hypothesis that pi is the greatest common
divisor of n1, n2, ..., nr. Therefore pj ≤ pi. With an analogous reasoning
pi ≤ pj is got, so implying pi = pj.
I now prove point ii). Take two agents in C, say i and j. Let m1, m2
be in Tij and m3 be in Tji. Since both m1 + m3 and m2 + m3 belong to
Tii and are hence divisible by pi, then m1 ≡ m2 (mod p). Let tij be so
deﬁned, tij ≡ m1 (mod p), and deﬁne similar numbers for any other agent
j. Then population turns out to be partioned into classes 0,1,...,p − 1,
where j belongs to class u if tij = u. Now take any j belonging to class
u and take any ˆ t ∈ Tij. For any ˜ t ∈ Tjr, since (ˆ t + ˜ t) ∈ Tir, it must be
tir = (ˆ t + ˜ t) mod p = (u + ˜ t) mod p, so proving what desired.
Finally I prove point iii). All the following are positive integers. Suppose
b1 and b2 have 1 as greatest common divisor. Since they have completely
diﬀerent factorizations, αb1 ≡ 0 (mod b2) ⇔ α = βb2. Because αb1 mod b2
27is diﬀerent from zero for α = 1,...,b2−1, there do not exist α1 and α2 such
that α1 < α2 < b2 and α1b1 ≡ α2b1 (mod b2), otherwise being (α2−α1)b1 ≡
0 (mod b2). This implies that there exists α11 such that α11b1 ≡ 1 (mod b2),
or in other words there exist α11, α12 such that α11b1 − α12b2 = 1. Now
take n1 and n2. Let a2 denote their greatest common divisor. There must
exist b1 and b2 such that n1 = b1a2 and n2 = b2a2, with 1 greatest common
divisor for b1 and b2. Hence, α11n1 − α12n2 = a2. Now consider n3. It is
obvious that the greatest common divisor of n1, n2 and n3 is equal to the
greatest common divisor of a2 and n3. Call it a3. With analogous resoning,
there exist α21 and α22 such that α21a2 − α22n3 = a3. So proceeding, it
is ﬁnally got αr−11ar−1 − αr−12nr = ar = p. Deﬁne ˜ n = n1
Qr−1
i=1 αi1 and




j=i+1 αj1. Therefore, ˜ n − ˆ n = p. Notice that
˜ n and ˆ n belong to Tii since it is closed under addition. Take t = aˆ n+bp, with
a ≥ ˆ n−1 and 0 ≤ b ≤ ˆ n−1. Therefore, it can be written t = (a−b)ˆ n+b˜ n,
so proving that any t = ˆ n(ˆ n − 1) + cp belongs to Tii. Deﬁne ˜ ti = ˆ n(ˆ n − 1).
Deﬁne ˜ t as the maximum over i of ˜ ti, existing for the ﬁniteness of the set of
agents. Let i belong to cyclic class u. Deﬁne ¯ tij as the minimum in the set
Tij, existing since Tij is a set of integers bounded from below, and deﬁne ¯ t
as the maximum over i and j of ¯ tij, existing by the ﬁniteness of the set of
players. Finally, ˆ t = ˜ t + ¯ t, and the desired result is got. 
Proof of lemma 3. If agent 1 selects alternative a at time t1 and memory
does not prevent its spreading, then only congestion problems can hinder
it. However, with positive probability a is imitated at time t1 + 1 by any j
such that G1j > 0. Take all those agents j such that G1j > 0. The same
reasoning can be applied to each of them, with a speciﬁcation. If there exist
j1, j2 and r with G1j1 > 0, G1j2 > 0, Gj1r > 0 and Gj2r > 0, it is clear
that both channels cannot be used for transmission. However, since both
channels carry the same alternative a, it is indiﬀerent which one prevails.
Therefore, with positive probability all those agents j such that G2
1j > 0
choose a at time t1 +2. Going on analogously since time t > ˜ t is reached, it
is got that with positive probability all those agents j such that G
t−t1
1j > 0
choose a at time t. The same procedure is then repeated for agent 2. Now it
may also happen for some ˆ t, j1, j2 and r to have G
ˆ t
1j1 > 0, G
ˆ t
2j2 > 0, Gj1r > 0
and Gj2r > 0. Again, both channels cannot be used for transmission, this
however not being a problem since the same alternative is carried. Going
on analogously for agents 3,4,...,l, it is ﬁnally got that at any time t > ˜ t
with positive probability all those agents j such that G
t−ti
ij > 0 for some
i = 1,...,l choose a.
Suppose now that at the same time ˜ t all the agents of a cyclic class
choose a. The procedure to obtain the proof is analogous to the one just
followed. However, by virtue of point ii in lemma 2 all those agents of C
inﬂuencing the choice at time t of the agents of cyclic class (u+t−˜ t) mod p
28choose a. In addition, it is assumed that any possible model belonging
to another communication class always chooses a. Hence, since congestion
problems only concern the transmission from diﬀerent channels of the same
alternative, a will be surely transmitted at any step. 
Proof of lemma 4. Let a denote the global maximum. All the agents in
every maximal communication class will never make a choice diﬀerent from
a, because there is no other imitable behavior and no superior alternative
can be remembered, since non-existent.
Take a class C among second-ranked classes, which are those inﬂuenced
only by maximal classes. Let p be its period.
By hypothesis, there exist two agents i and j, with i belonging to a
maximal class, j belonging to C and Gij = 1. Without loss of generality,
suppose j belongs to cyclic class 0. By virtue of point iii in lemma 2, there
exists ˜ t such that for all t ≥ ˜ t : Gt
jl > 0 for every agent l belonging to
cyclic class t mod p. Obviously, Gt
il > 0 holds too for t ≥ ˜ t + 1. Notice that
memory can never prevent alternative a from spreading since, by hypothesis,
a superior alternative does not exist. Consider that at time 0,1,...,p − 1
agent i selects a. Then, by virtue of point i in lemma 3, there is a positive
probability that at time ˜ t + p alternative a is selected by all the agents
belonging to cyclic classes (˜ t+p−ti) mod p, with ti = 1,...,p. This amounts
to say that all the agents in class C select a within a ﬁnite number of periods
with positive probability. If that happens, no choice diﬀerent from a will
ever be made by virtue of point ii in lemma 3 applied to every cyclic class,
so implying that everyone’s memory will be soon ﬁlled by a only.
The same reasoning can be applied to every second-ranked class, and af-
terwards to third-ranked classes - which are those not inﬂuenced by classes
diﬀerent from ﬁrst-ranked and second-ranked ones and which are not ﬁrst-
ranked or second-ranked classes themselves - and so on. The result is that,
starting from a state s, with a positive probability qs a state with all agents’
memories containing only alternative a is reached in a ﬁnite number of pe-
riods ˆ ts. If that is not the case, another state where the hypotheses of this
lemma are satisﬁed is reached in any case, since agents in maximal commu-
nication classes will never change their choice. Let q denote the minimum
of qs and ˆ t the maximum of ˆ ts, both existing by the ﬁniteness of the state
space. Therefore, the probability that the system will not converge to the
eﬃcient state in rˆ t periods is bounded from above by (1−q)r, which clearly
tends to zero when r → ∞. 
Proof of lemma 5. Condition i is ﬁrst considered. Suppose k > n −
||A(a)||. Call s the current state and suppose agent i’s memory contains a.
Each alternative diﬀerent from a can never appear more than once in i’s
memory, so implying that a will never be forgotten since memory is long
29enough. This in turn implies that within k periods a will be chosen by i.
Deﬁne ¯ tj as the minimum in the set Tij, existing since Tij is a set of integers
bounded from below, and deﬁne ¯ t as the maximum over j of ¯ tj, existing by
the ﬁniteness of the set of agents. By virtue of point i in lemma 3 there is a
positive probability that after ¯ t periods all agents have experienced a. Call
that probability qs. Notice that with the complementary probability 1−qs a
state where agent i has a memory containing a is reached. As it happens for
agent i, alternative a will never be forgotten by anyone once known. Since
cycles longer than k do not exist, once all agents have experienced a any
other alternative is no longer played after k periods and is forgotten within
other k periods. Let q denote the minimum of qs, existing by the ﬁniteness
of the state space. The probability that the system will not converge to the
eﬃcient state in r(k + ¯ t) + 2k periods is bounded from above by (1 − q)r,
which clearly tends to zero when r → ∞.
I now consider condition ii. Suppose there exists a cyclic class of C with
all the agents therein simultaneously choosing alternative a. By virtue of
point ii in lemma 3, the global maximum a will go on cycling among cyclic
classes, so never disappearing. Since a cycle longer than k does not exist,
the period of the cyclic class cannot be greater than k. Therefore, within k
periods all agents have experienced alternative a, which is never forgotten
by anyone. As before, the presence of a in memory and the inexistence of
cycles longer than k imply that any alternative diﬀerent from a is no longer
played after k periods and is forgotten within other k periods. Therefore
the eﬃcient state is got within 3k periods. 
Proof of lemma 6. Take any agent belonging to cyclic class 0 at current
time 0. A perturbation occurs and she chooses a, the global maximum. By
virtue of point iii in lemma 2 and point i in lemma 3 - the latter can be
applied since memory never prevents the global maximum from spreading
- after ˜ t periods all the agents of a certain cyclic class choose a. By point
ii in lemma 3 alternative a will go on being cyclically selected by the en-
tire appropriate cyclic class; therefore some kind of ergodic set E1 with this
feature has been reached. Now a perturbation occurs at time t1 mod p = 1,
inducing an agent belonging to cyclic class 0 to choose a. With an analogous
reasoning an ergodic set E2 is reached. Keep on with this procedure, pertur-
bations aﬀecting agents in cyclic class 0 at times t2 mod p = 2, t3 mod p = 3,
...,tp−1 mod p = p−1. In the ergodic set Ep every agent belonging to cyclic
classes t mod p, (t−t1) mod p = (t−1) mod p, (t−t2) mod p = (t−2) mod p,
..., (t−tp−1) mod p = (t−p+1) mod p chooses the global maximum. There-
fore, by point ii in lemma 2 it follows that Er is the eﬃcient state. 
Proof of lemma 7. I ﬁrst prove point i. Assume k = 1 and p = 1.
Suppose there does not exist a local maximum diﬀerent from the global
30maximum a and that, starting from the eﬃcient state, a single perturbation
occurs inducing an agent to choose b 6= a. Observe that no agent can
choose b twice in a row since memory prevents from doing that. Observe
also that no new alternative can rise in the unperturbed dynamics since
that would require that all the models of an agent choosing b chose b as
well; however, since b can only be chosen by imitation (because there is
no existing alternative from which b is the best accessible choice), some
of i’s models must have chosen b at the previous time, against the ﬁrst
observation. These two considerations ensure that the global maximum will
never disappear. This in turn implies by virtue of point iii of lemma 2
and point i in lemma 3 that with positive probability the global maximum,
whose spreading is never prevented by memory, will be chosen at the same
time by all the agents of the unique cyclic class, that granting the reaching
of the eﬃcient state and proving the impossibility of leaving such absorbing
state by a single perturbation.
Suppose now there exists a local maximum b diﬀerent from the global
maximum a and that, starting from the eﬃcient state, a perturbation occurs
inducing an agent to choose b. Since memory does not prevent its spreading,
then point iii in lemma 2 and point i in lemma 3 apply establishing that
with positive probability all the agents of the unique cyclic class will choose
b at the same time. Obviously, that is an absorbing state, so completing the
proof of point i.
I now prove point ii. Assume k > 1 or p > 1 or both. Starting from
the eﬃcient state a perturbation occurs inducing agent i belonging to cyclic
class u to choose b 6= a at time 0. If A(a) = C then memory prevents others
from imitating b, while at time 1 agent i copies out a with the result that b
is no longer chosen and it is forgotten within k periods, when the eﬃcient
state is reached again.
Suppose that A(a) 6= C and b / ∈ A(a). No agent belonging to cyclic
classes diﬀerent from (u + t) mod p can choose b at time t, since all the
agents in the other cyclic classes will choose a by point ii in lemma 3. No
other alternative can rise, because that would require personal experience
to favour an alternative diﬀerent from a, which is never the case, since a is
never forgotten by anyone.
Suppose k ≥ p. Suppose ad absurdum that an ergodic set diﬀerent from
the absorbing state has been reached. Then at time t all the agents belonging
to cyclic class (u+t) mod p must choose b, otherwise by point iii in lemma 2
and point i in lemma 3 a can spread with positive probability at a ﬁnite time
˜ t to all the agents in cyclic class (u + ˜ t) mod p, so determining the reaching
of the eﬃcient state once b has left anyone’s memory. This however requires
that agents choose b with period p, that is when such inferior alternative is
still in memory. Hence a contradiction has been got.
Finally, suppose k < p. Memory never prevents b from spreading because
b cannot come back before p periods. The usual point iii in lemma 2 and
31point i in lemma 3 apply: with positive probability after ˜ t periods all the
agents of a cyclic class choose b, and from then on all the agents in the
appropriate cyclic class will choose b by point ii in lemma 3. Therefore an
ergodic set where at any time p−1 cyclic classes choose a and the remaining
cyclic class chooses b is reached, completing the proof. 
Proof of proposition 2. Consider all the ergodic sets E1,E2,...,Es of
Pk. The resistance rij between the ergodic sets Ei and Ej is deﬁned as the
minimum number of perturbations necessary to move from Ei to Ej with
positive probability under Pk. Deﬁne an Ei-tree as a tree rooted in Ei using
all the ergodic sets as nodes. The resistance of an Ei-tree is deﬁned as the
sum of all the resistances met when going from any terminal node to the
root. Finally, the stochastic potential of Ei is the minimum resistance over
all the trees rooted at Ei.
Young (1993) proved that the stochastically stable distribution for a
regular perturbed Markov chain - as it is the model under analysis - exists
and assigns positive probability to all and only those ergodic sets of the
unperturbed dynamics which have minimum stochastic potential.
First, notice that each maximal communication class is independent of
the rest of the system and when eﬃciency is reached in all the maximal
communication classes no other perturbation is required to get overall eﬃ-
ciency with positive probability (actually lemma 4 tells more, ensuring that
it will happen almost surely). Furthermore, notice that a stochastic poten-
tial cannot be lower than s − 1, since the minimum resistance rij is 1 and
the number of branches of any tree is s−1. Then by lemma 6 the stochastic
potential of the eﬃcient state is equal to s − 1. Therefore the eﬃcient state
always receives positive probability in the stochastically stable distribution.
Suppose that in all the maximal communication classes of G condition
1.i or condition 1.ii in the terms of this proposition is satisﬁed. By lemma
7 a single perturbation does not suﬃce to move the system away from eﬃ-
ciency in each maximal communication class. By lemma 4 a perturbation
outside maximal communication classes does not have any chance to aﬀect
the system permanently. Hence, whatever Ei-tree with Ei diﬀerent from the
eﬃcient state, the branch coming from the eﬃcient state has a resistance
greater than 1, so implying a stochastic potential greater than s − 1. The
result is that the stochastically stable distribution assigns probability 1 to
the eﬃcient conﬁguration.
Suppose now that in a maximal communication class neither condition
1.i nor condition 1.ii is satisﬁed. By lemma 7 a single perturbation can move
the system away from eﬃciency for that maximal communication class and,
consequently, for the entire system. Denote by Ej an ergodic set which
the system can reach from the eﬃcient state. Denote the eﬃcient state by
Er. Consider an Er-tree with resistance s − 1. Delete the branch coming
32from Ej and add a branch from Er to Ej. What comes out is an Ej-tree
with resistance s−1. Therefore the stochastically stable distribution assigns
positive probability to ineﬃcient ergodic sets.
I ﬁnally prove point 2 of the proposition. Let ˜ E be an ergodic set or
an union of ergodic sets of Pk. The radius of ˜ E is the minimum number of
perturbations required to reach with positive probability a state in another
ergodic set starting from a state in ˜ E. The coradius is the maximum over all
states of the minimum number of perturbations required to reach a state in
Ei with positive probability. The modiﬁed coradius - denoted by CR∗(Ei) -
is deﬁned analogously to the coradius with the diﬀerence that the number of
perturbations is modiﬁed by subtracting the radiuses of all the intermediate
ergodic sets passed through.
Let E be the union of ergodic sets which have positive probability in the
stochastically stable distribution. If no other ergodic sets exist then trivially
CR∗(E) = 0. If other ergodic sets exist, then by lemma 6 CR∗(E) =
1. By proposition 2 in Ellison (1993), for any state s / ∈ E, W(s,E,) =
O(−CR∗(E)) as  → 0. 
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